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Abstract
We prove existence of steady-state equilibrium in a class of matching models
with search frictions.
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1. Introduction
This paper contributes to the literature on the pairwise matching of
heterogenous agents with search frictions. The basic structure of our model
is as in Shimer and Smith (2000) or Smith (2006): There is a continuum of
infinitely lived agents who are either matched or unmatched at any moment
in time. Meetings between unmatched agents are generated by an exogenous
search technology. Upon meeting, agents play a bargaining game, determining
whether or not they become matched and provided they do so, their payoffs
within the match. The main concern of the literature studying such models
(surveyed in Smith, 2011) is the characterization of matching patterns in
steady-state equilibria. Here we focus on the question of existence of steady-
state equilibria.
Previously, this question has been addressed using two distinct approaches.
Shimer and Smith (2000) provide an existence argument applicable both
to models with transferable and nontransferable utility (see Smith, 2006),
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but requiring that—given the agents’ decisions which matches to accept—
there is a unique distribution of unmatched agents which maintains a steady
state. To obtain this uniqueness property, Shimer and Smith (2000) impose
the stringent assumption of a quadratic search technology.1 In contrast,
the approach developed in Manea (2014a) accommodates general search
technologies, but requires the uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs in an auxiliary
model in which the distribution of unmatched agents searching for a partner
is taken as given. While Manea (2014a) establishes this uniqueness property
for a model with transferable utility, it is evident from Adachi (2003) that, in
general, this property fails with nontransferable utility.
In the following we develop an approach to proving existence of steady-
state equilibrium which dispenses with the uniqueness requirements in Shimer
and Smith (2000) and Manea (2014a). This yields existence under minimal
regularity conditions on the search technology, akin to the ones introduced in
Manea (2014a), and the bargaining problem faced by the agents when deciding
on a match, allowing for both transferable and nontransferable utility.
2. Model
There is an exogenous measure θi > 0 of players of type i ∈ N = {1, . . . , n},
or simply players i.2 Players are risk neutral, infinitely lived, and discount
payoffs at rate r > 0. Time is continuous. We consider steady states in which a
measure µi > 0 of players i is unmatched and a measure θi−µi > 0 is matched.
The unmatched players search: each unmatched player i meets unmatched
players j at Poisson rate ρij(µ) ≥ 0, where µ = (µ1, . . . , µn) ∈ Rn++.
Assumption 1. There exists a continuous function m : Rn+ → Rn×n+ , satisfy-
ing (i) mij(µ) = mji(µ) for all µ ∈ Rn+ and (ii) mij(µ) = 0 whenever µi = 0,
such that
ρij(µ) =
mij(µ)
µi
, ∀µ ∈ Rn++. (1)
1While No¨ldeke and Tro¨ger (2009) refine the existence argument from Shimer and
Smith (2000) to cover linear search technologies neither proof extends to general search
technologies. See Manea (2014a) for further discussion.
2We follow Manea (2014a) in considering a finite type space rather than a continuum
of types, thus sidestepping technicalities—but not, as discussed in Smith (2011), the
substantive issues—in Shimer and Smith (2000). In a similar vein, we follow most of the
literature in suppressing the measure theoretic considerations discussed and resolved in
Manea (2014b).
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Assumption 1 is similar to the assumption on meeting rates in Manea
(2014a). From equation (1), mij(µ) = ρij(µ)µi. Hence, mij(µ) is the mass
of players i who meet a player j per unit time, which – as stated in part
(i) of Assumption 1 – should equal the mass mji(µ) = ρji(µ)µj of players
j who meet a player i per unit time. As the mass of meetings is assumed
continuous in the distribution of unmatched types, part (ii) of Assumption 1
is the natural boundary condition that the mass of meetings involving players
i approaches zero as µi vanishes (see Stevens, 2007).
When unmatched players i and j meet, they play a bargaining game
determining whether or not they form a match—enter a relationship—and if
they do, the flow payoffs that they obtain until their match dissolves. Each
match is dissolved randomly at Poisson rate ω > 0. Separated partners return
to the pool of unmatched agents. If players do not agree to match, they
instantaneously return to the pool of unmatched agents.
If a fraction aij ∈ [0, 1] of meetings between unmatched agents i and j
results in a match, then the outflow of players i from the pool of unmatched
agents per unit time is
∑
j∈N aijmij(µ). The inflow of such players into the
unmatched pool is given by the mass of matched players i multiplied with
the exogenous rate at which the matches of such players are dissolved, i.e.,
ω(θi − µi). In a steady state, inflows and outflows must balance, delivering
the balance condition
ω (θi − µi) =
∑
j∈N
aijmij(µ), ∀i ∈ N. (2)
Denote by vi the expected (continuation) value of an unmatched player i
and by vij the expected value of a player i conditional on a meeting with a
player j before the bargaining in the pair has commenced. The flow payoff of
unmatched players is zero. Because a player i meets a player j at rate ρij(µ)
and such a meeting results in a capital gain of gij = vij − vi, we have the
value condition
rvi =
∑
j∈N
ρij(µ)gij, ∀i ∈ N. (3)
Agents are free to refuse to enter a relationship, so that vi ≥ 0 and gij ≥ 0. In
the following v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ Rn+ denotes the vector of continuation values,
the matrix g ∈ Rn×n+ collects the gains gij, and the set of feasible matching
probabilities aij is
A = {a ∈ [0, 1]n×n | aij = aji,∀(i, j) ∈ N ×N}. (4)
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The matching probabilities aij and the gains gij are determined by an
equilibrium in the bargaining game between players i and j. We treat the
bargaining game as a “black box” by specifying a bargaining correspondence
E : Rn+ ⇒ A×Rn×n+ , mapping vectors of continuation values v into outcomes
(a, g). The interpretation is that (a, g) is an equilibrium outcome in the
collection of bilateral bargaining games induced by a vector of continuation
values v if and only if (a, g) satisfies the bargaining condition
(a, g) ∈ E(v). (5)
Assumption 2. The bargaining correspondence E : Rn+ ⇒ A × Rn×n+ is
upper hemicontinuous with E(v) non-empty, closed, and convex-valued for all
v ∈ Rn+. Further, there exists g¯ ∈ R+ such that E(v) ⊂ A × [0, g¯]n×n holds
for all v ∈ Rn+.
Section 4 derives the bargaining correspondence for two common specifi-
cations of the bargaining problem. In both cases, Assumption 2 is satisfied.
Definition 1. A steady-state equilibrium is a tuple (µ, v, a, g) ∈ Rn++×Rn+×
A× Rn×n+ satisfying the balance condition (2), the value condition (3), and
the bargaining condition (5).
3. Result
Proposition 1. A steady-state equilibrium exists if Assumptions 1 and 2
hold.
The idea underlying the proof of Proposition 1 is as follows: We may
rewrite the balance condition (2) as
µi =
θi −
∑
j∈N aijmij(µ)
ω
, ∀i ∈ N (6)
and the value condition (3) as
vi =
∑
j∈N ρij(µ)gij
r
, ∀i ∈ N. (7)
Together with the bargaining condition (5) the right sides of (6) and (7)
define a mapping (µ, v, a, g) 7−→ (µ′, v′, a′, g′). Fixed points of this mapping
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coincide with steady-state equilibria. Assumptions 1 and 2 then ensure that
the existence of steady-state equilibria can be inferred from Kakutani’s fixed
point theorem.
The key difference to the fixed point argument in Shimer and Smith
(2000) is that these authors, rather than using the equilibrium conditions in
a parallel fashion as we do, compose them to define a mapping v 7−→ v′. For
this mapping to be well-behaved, it is required that the balance condition has
a unique solution µ for any given a. Similarly, Manea (2014a) composes the
equilibrium conditions to define a mapping µ 7−→ µ′ and requires that, for
given µ, the equilibrium conditions determine (v, g) uniquely for this mapping
to be well-behaved.
Proof of Proposition 1. Let M˜ =
∏
i∈N [0, θi]. Define the function ζ : M˜ →
Rn by
ζi(µ) = ω (µi − θi) +
∑
j∈N
mij(µ), ∀i ∈ N. (8)
Using Assumption 1, ζi(µ) = −ωθi < 0 holds whenever µi = 0. Further, ζ
is uniformly continuous on M˜ because M˜ is compact. Hence, there exists
ηi ∈ (0, θi) such that ζi(µ) < 0 holds whenever µi ≤ ηi. Pick such ηi > 0 for
all i ∈ N and let
M =
∏
i∈N
[ηi, θi]. (9)
The set M is non-empty, compact, and convex. By Assumption 1, the meeting
rates ρij are continuous on the compact set M and, thus, bounded above by
some ρ¯ > 0 on M . Define
V =
∏
i∈N
[
0,
nρ¯g¯
r
]
, (10)
which is non-empty, compact, and convex.
Define the function ψµ : M × A→M by
ψµi (µ, a) = max{θi −
∑
j∈N aijmij(µ)
ω
, ηi}, ∀i ∈ N. (11)
By continuity of mij (Assumption 1), the function ψ
µ is continuous. The set
A, defined in (4), is compact, convex, and non-empty.
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From Assumption 2 there exists g¯ ∈ R++ such that E(v) ⊂ A× [0, g¯]n×n
holds for all v ∈ Rn+. Let G = [0, g¯]n×n, which is non-empty, compact, and
convex. Define the continuous function ψv : M ×G→ V by
ψvi (µ, g) =
∑
j∈N ρij(µ)gij
r
, ∀i ∈ N. (12)
Observing that the restriction of the bargaining correspondence E to the
domain V satisfies Assumption 2, the correspondence ψ : M × V ×A×G⇒
M × V × A×G, defined by
ψ(µ, v, a, g) = ({ψµ(µ, a)}, {ψv(µ, g)}, E(v)), (13)
then satisfies the assumptions of Kakutani’s fixed point theorem. Hence,
there exists (µ∗, v∗, a∗, g∗) ∈ M × V × A × G such that (µ∗, v∗, a∗, g∗) =
ψ(µ∗, v∗, a∗, g∗).
It remains to show that such a fixed point of ψ satisfies conditions (2), (3),
and (5). For conditions (3) and (5) this is immediate from the construction
of ψ. It remains to establish (2). This follows from (11), provided that
θi −
∑
j∈N a
∗
jimij(µ
∗)
ω
≥ ηi, ∀i ∈ N. (14)
Suppose not. From (11) there then exists i ∈ N satisfying µ∗i = ηi and
ωθi −
∑
j∈N a
∗
ijmij(µ
∗) < ωηi. From (8) this implies ζi(µ∗) > 0 with µ∗i = ηi.
Because µ∗ ∈M and, thus, µ∗ ∈ M˜ , this contradicts the definition of ηi.
4. The Bargaining Correspondence: Examples
Working with Assumption 2, rather than with an explicitly specified
model of the bargaining problem, makes our analysis applicable to a variety
of bargaining models. We illustrate this with two examples giving rise to
bargaining correspondences satisfying Assumption 2. The first example is
based on Shimer and Smith (2000). The second example is based on Smith
(2006) and establishes existence for the model in Lauermann and No¨ldeke
(2014).
Example 1 (Transferable Utility). The set of feasible flow payoffs in a
relationship between players i and j is
Sij = {(si, sj) ∈ R2 | si + sj ≤ sij}, (15)
6
where sij = sji ∈ R holds for all (i, j) ∈ N ×N . The bargaining protocol is as
follows. In each meeting the two players are informed about each other’s type.
One player is randomly chosen to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer specifying
a pair of flow payoffs (si, sj) ∈ Sij. The other player then either accepts
or rejects that offer. If player i is chosen as a proposer with probability
pij ∈ [0, 1] and we consider the subgame perfect equilibria of the bargaining
game induced by continuation values v, we have (a, g) ∈ E(v) if and only if
gij = pij
max {sij − rvi − rvj, 0}
r + ω
(16)
and
aij =
{
0 if sij < rvi + rvj
1 if sij > rvi + rvj
(17)
for all (i, j) ∈ N ×N . This bargaining correspondence satisfies Assumption 2
with g¯ = max(i,j)∈N×N sij/(r + ω).
Example 2 (Nontransferable Utility). The set of feasible flow payoffs
contains a single point (sij, sji) ∈ R2 for every (i, j) ∈ N ×N . The bargain-
ing protocol is that both players, being informed about each other’s type,
simultaneously declare whether they accept or refuse to match. The match
forms if and only if both players accept. Eliminating dominated strategies,
the equilibrium condition on the fraction bij ∈ [0, 1] of player i who accept a
player j is
bij =
{
0 if sij < rvi
1 if sij > rvi.
(18)
The resulting matching probability is
aij = bijbji (19)
and the corresponding gain is
gij = bijbji
sij − vi
r + ω
. (20)
Therefore, (a, u) ∈ E(v) if and only if there exists some b ∈ [0, 1]n×n
satisfying (18) such that (19)–(20) hold. Assumption 2 holds with g¯ =
max(i,j)∈N×N sij/(r + ω).
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5. Discussion
We have dispensed with uniqueness requirements used in previous proofs
of the existence of steady-state equilibria in matching models with search
frictions, thus enlarging the range of models for which existence can be shown.
Some further extensions are easy to come by. For instance, our analysis carries
over to a discrete—rather than continuous—time model without substantive
changes. While we have considered infinitely lived agents who return to search
whenever their current match is dissolved, our results are also applicable to an
equivalent model with a stationary inflow of finitely lived agents (Eeckhout,
1999). Other extensions, e.g., allowing for a continuum of types or search by
matched agents, require more work.
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